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1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop a macroeconomic agent-based model to study how financial instability
can emerge from the co-evolution of interbank and credit markets and the possible policy responses
to mitigate its impact on the real economy.
Crises in the banking sector are intermittent phenomena that generally appear after periods of
intensive credit growth (Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). They usually
impose high costs not only to the financial sector but also to the economy at large (Reinhart and
Rogo↵, 2009). The damaging real e↵ects and the feedback loops of the financial turmoil of 2008 also
showed that systemic risks can arise during periods of apparent economic tranquility (Battiston
et al., 2012, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2015), and that neither monetary policy nor micro-prudential
regulations are su cient to smooth systemic financial imbalances.
What are the transmission mechanisms between the banking sector and the real economy?
On the one side, banking crises hit real economies via the financial accelerator (Bernanke et al.,
2007; Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek, 2012; Delli Gatti et al., 2010). On the other side, banking crises
and credit supply also depend on liquidity freezes in the interbank market (Freixas et al., 2011;
Angelini et al., 2011; Acharya and Merrouche, 2012). Indeed, the facility through which banks
can get liquidity a↵ects their credit supply thus dampening or magnifying the financial accelerator
dynamics (Cornett et al., 2011; Iyer et al., 2013).
For this reason, the evolving debate on interactions between monetary and macro-prudential
policies (see Angelini et al., 2014; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014; Paoli and Paustian, 2017,
among others) should also be focusing on the co-evolution of interbank and credit markets and their
possible impact on financial stability and, more generally, on economic dynamics. For instance,
one should better study how the Liquidity Coverage Ratio — one of the levers of the Basel III
macro-prudential framework — a↵ects liquidity risk and the supply of bank credit. More generally,
macro-prudential and monetary policy should also consider active liquidity management. However,
the growing body of literature emerging after the 2008 crisis partially overlooks this issue and
does not provide models jointly accounting for liquidity crises, banking stability, and economic
dynamics.1 In particular, do Basel III regulatory tools amplify or reduce the risk of liquidity
crises? Can one design a macro-prudential framework that dampens instabilities in both liquidity
and credit markets? Should monetary policy “lean against the wind”? What are the e↵ects of
this type of policy in the interbank liquidity market? Do we need other tools besides interest-rate
policy to avoid liquidity crises?
We try to address these questions extending the agent-based model developed in Popoyan et al.
(2017) to include the interbank market.2 The model describes an economy composed of heteroge-
1To the best of our knowledge, there is no model combining liquidity crises, a regulatory instrument to safeguard
banking stability, and economic dynamics. They rather discuss singular aspects: liquidity regulations and financial
stability(see Diamond and Kashyap, 2016; Duijm and Wierts, 2016, among others), liquidity crisis and monetary
policy (see Berger and Bouwman, 2017; Williamson, 2012; Adrian and Shin, 2009), financial regulations and credit
(Kashyap et al., 2014; Cornett et al., 2011), etc.
2A direct ancestor of the model is developed in Ashraf et al. (2011) and Ashraf et al. (2017).
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neous firms, banks, consumers, government and a Central Bank. Firms and consumers engage in
trading relationships in decentralized goods and labor markets. Firms finance production relying on
bank credit, whose supply is constrained by macro-prudential regulations. Banks engage in liquid-
ity trading in the interbank market to satisfy liquidity needs arising from liquidity constraints. The
Central Bank can supply liquidity in the interbank market; it performs monetary policy applying
di↵erent types of Taylor rules and imposes a macro-prudential regulatory framework akin to either
Basel II or III. Finally, the government performs fiscal policy, bails out banks in case of crisis, and
eventually issues bonds to finance the deficit.
Our model belongs to an expanding literature of agent-based macro-models (ABMs; Tesfatsion
and Judd, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008) where the economy is considered as a complex
system evolving out-of-equilibrium and where aggregate dynamics arise as an emergent property
out of interactions among heterogeneous agents (Farmer and Foley, 2009; Dosi, 2012; Kirman,
2016).3 In that, ABMs are particularly suited to study credit and liquidity market dynamics where
heterogenous agent-specific solvency and liquidity risks a↵ect their interactions and can possibly
lead to coordination failures, market freezes and bankruptcy cascades.4
Simulation results show that the model endogenously generates interbank market freezes wherein
liquidity dries up and interbank interest rates become significantly high. These anomalous situa-
tions in turn interact with the financial accelerator possibly leading to firm bankruptcies, banking
crises and the emergence of deep downturns. The risk of market freezes in the interbank market
requires the timely intervention of the Central Bank as liquidity lender of last resort to curb the
negative impacts in other markets. Furthermore, we show that the joint adoption of a three man-
date Taylor rule tackling credit growth and the Basel III macro-prudential framework is the best
policy combination to stabilize financial and real economic dynamics. We then perform a detailed
analysis of the di↵erent levers of Basel III and we find that the combination of static and dynamic
capital requirements is the most e↵ective in dampening the pro-cyclicality of credit and to stabilize
the banking sector and the aggregate economy. On the contrary, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(LCR) spurs financial instability increasing the pro-cyclicality of banks’ liquid reserves. For this
reason, we design a new macro-prudential tool which adds a counter-cyclical liquidity bu↵er to the
LCR. The new enhanced LCR now contributes to stabilize fluctuations in the interbank market.
Relatedly, we find that active management of the width and symmetry of the interest-rate corridor
by the Central Bank is a new unconventional monetary policy tool to dampen financial instabil-
3For critical surveys of macroeconomic agent-based models see Fagiolo and Roventini (2012); Ga↵ard and Napo-
letano (2012); Fagiolo and Roventini (2017) and Dawid and Delli Gatti (2018). A discussion of agent-based models
from the perspective of the evolution of macroeconomic theory is in Napoletano (2018); Dosi and Roventini (2019).
Finally, Haldane and Turrell (2018b,a) discuss the complementarity between agent-based and traditional models in
macroeconomics.
4For macroeconomic agent-based models with integration of credit and financial markets see Alexandre and Lima
(2017), Assenza et al. (2015), Bookstaber et al. (2017), Caiani et al. (2016), Ashraf et al. (2017), Catullo et al. (2017),
Dosi et al. (2010, 2013, 2015, 2018), Delli Gatti et al. (2005, 2010), Fagiolo et al. (2017a), Gross and Poblacio´n (2017),
Gai et al. (2011), Gurgone et al. (2018), Klimek et al. (2015), Krug et al. (2015), Krug (2018), Lengnick et al. (2013),
Montagna and Kok (2016), Napoletano et al. (2015), Poledna et al. (2014), Riccetti et al. (2018), Russo et al. (2016),
Raberto et al. (2012), Seppecher and Salle (2015), Sakiyama et al. (2016), Teglio et al. (2012), van der Hoog (2018).
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ity. Generally, our results support the Tinbergen principle: an adequate number of instruments is
required to control inflation and to achieve stability in both interbank and credit markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The results of
policy experiments are reported in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The model builds on Popoyan et al. (2017) and Ashraf et al. (2017) and is populated by N agents,
which can be workers (denoted by subscript z) or shops (denoted by subscript i), and by M banks
(denoted by subscript m). In addition, the model includes a government managing fiscal policy and
a central bank that sets monetary and macro-prudential policies. In the model, n di↵erent types of
non-perishable goods can be produced with n types of labor. Each agent (described by subscript z)
is characterized by a vector (i, j, j+1), where i describes the good the agent can produce, and j and
j + 1 stand for the agent’s primary and secondary consumption goods respectively.5 Each agent is
also endowed with one unit of labor i and cannot consume the good is able to produce (i.e., i 6= j
and i 6= j + 1). This introduces the motivation for trade in the model and the existence of shops,
which combine both production and trading functions (see also Howitt and Clower, 2000). Shops
finance production with their stock of liquid assets and then, if it is not enough, with credit. Loans
to shops are made with full recourse and are collateralized by inventories. Banks provide credit
to shops according to risk evaluation and macro-prudential regulation and accept deposits. Banks
manage their liquidity by exchanging funds in the interbank market. Finally, liquidity matching
in the interbank market is managed by a central clearing counterparty (CCP, see also section 2.5
below).
Figure 1 provides a stylized representation of the model. In what follows we briefly describe the
main features of the model and we refer the reader to Appendix A and to Popoyan et al. (2017)
for more details.
2.1 The timeline of events
The real and financial side of the economy are linked by multiple, non-linear feedbacks, and evolve
in a finite time horizon, indexed by t = 1, ..., T . Each period corresponds to a week. In every period
t, the following sequence of events takes place:
1. policy variables (e.g., baseline interest rate, sales tax rate, etc.) are fixed;
2. new shops enter the market;
3. wages and prices are fixed;
4. search and matching occur in the goods and labor markets;
5As there is one agent for every single type of good, the number of agents is equal to N = n(n  2).
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Figure 1: Structure of the model with interbank market
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5. trading in labor and good markets occur;
6. trading in financial and interbank markets occur;
7. bankrupted shops exit and troubled banks are recapitalized.
At the end of each time step, aggregate variables (e.g., output, inflation, unemployment, etc.) are
computed, summing over the corresponding microeconomic variables.
2.2 The goods and labor markets
At the beginning of each period, each worker can decide to open a shop with probability ✓/(N)
(1 6 ✓ 6 N). If given the setup costs (S) entry is profitable and she is able to find both potential
employees and workers, the shop opens and the worker becomes a “shop owner” (see Appendix A
for a detailed description.). Given the entry and exit process, the number of shops in the economy
change over time.
Trading in labor market starts with shops fixing the wage (w). A shop confirms its workers
unless its labor input exceeds its target and the ratio of inventory-to-sales target (IS) exceeds the
critical threshold. Employees keep on working for a shop as long as the wage they get is higher
than their e↵ective wage (wefft ). Moreover, a worker who is either employed or unemployed may
also engage in the search for a new job with probability   (0     1). She sends a demand to a
randomly selected shop producing the same type of production good as the one they can produce.
The searching agent is hired if a job vacancy is open and the e↵ective wage of the job searcher is
less than the wage o↵ered by the shop owner.
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Trading in goods market starts with consumers learning the selling price (ps) at the stores they
know and placing an order for certain amount (cs) which satisfies their preferences subject to their
budget constraint (see also Section 2.3 below). If inventories of a shop are enough, the order is
fulfilled, and the consumer pays the price peffs . Agents can also search for new shops where to buy
goods. More specifically, they will ask the price to a randomly chosen shop producing the same
type of good they like, and they will then select it if its price is lower than the one they currently
pay. Finally, agents adjust their balance sheets and fix their planned consumption expenditures
once search and matching activities are closed.
2.3 Budget planning and portfolio choices
All agents, i.e., shop-owners, workers, bank owners, engage in consumption smoothing. They first
adaptively compute their expected permanent income (Y pz,t; see Appendix A for details), and then
they set planned consumption (CEz,t) as a fixed fraction of the sum of past financial wealth (Az,t)
and of expected permanent income:6
CEz,t =  (Az,t + Y
p
z,t). (1)
Consumption is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. If an agent’s financial wealth is high
enough, then the agent satisfies her consumption plans and saves the residual. Otherwise, con-
sumption is constrained by the level of the agent’s financial wealth.
Once consumption needs are satisfied, agents with positive financial wealth allocate it among
di↵erent assets taking into account the cash-in-advance constraint. This choice is di↵erent according
to the agent’s status (worker, shop owner, bank owner). The post-consumption wealth of workers is
allocated to bank deposits. The saving strategy of a shop owner, is similar to a worker’s one, except
for the fact that she may need first to repay the credit obtained from banks to finance production.
Finally, the portfolio choice of a bank owner depends on the financial condition of her bank: if the
bank is “troubled”, that is it violates regulatory constraints (see also Section 2.4), wealth will be
employed to increase bank’s equity; otherwise, it will be deposited.
2.4 Banks and credit supply
Banks gather deposits and provide credit to shop owners to finance their production plans. Besides,
they can also lend/borrow from other banks in the interbank market or from the Central Bank to
manage their liquidity. The balance sheet structure of banks is presented in Figure 2. The asset
side of a bank’s m balance sheet is composed of cash reserves held at the central bank Hbm, loans
granted to shops Lsm, Government bonds B
b
m, collaterals SC
b
m seized from defaulted shops (see
Equation 8 below), and interbank loans to other banks IBam. Liabilities include deposits D
s
m and
6Note that the financial wealth of a worker is the sum of his stock of cash, bank deposits and of the fair value
of inventories (if any). For a shop owner, financial wealth is composed by the sum of the stock of cash and bank
deposits less outstanding loans. For a bank owner financial wealth is formed by cash on the bank’s account plus the
value of equity minus the amount of regulatory capital.
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Figure 2: The balance sheet of a bank in the model
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balance sheet identities hold in the model (see also Table 4) and the value of bank’s equity, Ebm, is
equal to the value of bank’s assets minus liabilities.
Banks satisfying regulatory capital requirements (cf. Section 2.6) can provide credit to shops
and set their supply according to a reserve of exposures constraint:
Lsupm,t =
1
✏u
Ebm,t   ( LLsm,t +  SCSCbm,t +  IBIBbm,t), (2)
where u captures the macro-prudential policy scenario (respectively u = 2 for Basel II, and u = 3 for
Basel III) and ✏b is the minimum capital requirement. Notice that ( LLsm,t+ SCSC
b
m,t+ IBIB
b
m,t)
represents the bank’s total exposure to credit risk.
Bank screens credit applications from shops and grant credit on the basis of a “6C” approach of
creditworthiness (Popoyan et al., 2017). This approach is commonly used in practice to identify the
financial vulnerability of the potential clients (see, e.g. Jiang, 2007).7 In a nutshell, this approach
aims at determining whether a credit applicant has enough capital, whether it can generate enough
cash-flow to pay the loan back, and whether it can provide enough collateral to guarantee the loan.
More precisely, the bank checks first the Capacity of the shop to repay the loan by using the
“quick ratio” (QRi,t) and the “return on asset” (ROA):
QRi,t =
Current Assets-Inventories
Current Liabilities
=
Dsi,t +H
s
i,t   Ii,t
Lsi,t
  , (3)
7Note that in our version of the “6C” approach, only Capital, Capacity, and Collateral, are used. This is because
the remaining three C’s (i.e., Conditions, Character, and Common sense) are based on credit grantors historical
experience with their clients and thus are highly subjective.
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ROAi,t =
Net income(after tax)
Total assets
=
⇧si,t
Dsi,t +H
s
i,t + Ii,t
  ⇣, (4)
where Hsi , D
s
i and Ii, are respectively cash and deposits and the value of inventories of shop i, ⇧
s
i,
are its profits, and 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1 are parameters set in tune with real world banks’
internal managerial practices (see also Table 3 and Appendix B). The Capital check is performed
by using the “debt-to-equity” ratio (DER):
DERi,t =
Total liabilities
Equity
=
Lsi,t
Esi,t
  %, (5)
with 0 < % < 1.
Finally, firms satisfying the three conditions above undergo the Collateral check. As firms in the
model have only working capital, their collateral is represented by their stock of inventories. The
price of collateral is set applying a constant loan-to-value ratio h to the unit value of inventories,
assumed to be equal to their marginal cost of production (Wt(1 + ⇡⇤)):
Ph,t = hWt(1 + ⇡
⇤), (6)
where h is a constant loan-to-value ratio, Wt is publicly known average wage rate across all shops
computed by the Government and ⇡⇤ is the Central Banks’s target inflation rate calculated as the
average in the US throughout 1984-2006.
The total size of a loan to a firm is therefore equal to:
Lsi,t = Ph,t(Ii,t + S) = hWt(1 + ⇡
⇤)(Ii,t + S),
where S denotes set-up cost of new firms, and Ii,t is the value of inventories provided as collateral.
Note that the rate h captures the risk tolerance of banks when providing credit to a firm.
Shops that pass all the above tests are eligible to receive a loan from a bank. However, if a
shop’s credit demand is higher than bank’s residual credit supply (see Equation 2 above), the shop
is credit rationed (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
The bank’s lending rate is homogeneous across banks in our artificial economy. Banks fix such
a rate by applying an annual spread (s > 0) on the nominal interest rate set by the Central Bank
(see Eq. 13 below):8
iLt = it + s/48. (7)
Finally, the deposit interest rate is equal to the central bank interest rate, i.e., iDt = it.
In the model, if a shop cannot repay its debt, it becomes insolvent and goes bankrupt. In
that case, as loans are made with full recourse, the bank seizes the deposits and the inventories of
insolvent shops up to the amount of the non-paid loan. Seized inventories (SCb) stay in a bank’s
8We calibrate the annual loan spread s to be equivalent to the spread between commercial loans and deposits in
the US for the period of 1986-2008.
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balance sheet until they are sold in the firesale markets with a firesale price Pf equal to:
Pf,t =
Wt(1 + ⇡⇤)
2
. (8)
If seized inventories are lower than a granted loan, the bank will experience losses, and it could
become “troubled” or even bankrupt if its equity becomes negative. Bankrupted banks are bailed
out by the Government, that inject enough sources until the equity satisfies the minimum capital
requirement (see Section 2.6 below).9
2.5 The interbank market
Besides providing loans to shops in the real sector, banks may also engage in liquidity trading in
the interbank market.
Demand and supply of liquidity arising from liquidity requirements are fulfilled either as the
desired target (under the Basel II scenario) or as a macro-prudential regulatory constraint (under
the Basel III scenario). In particular, banks are required to keep the ratio between high-quality
liquid assets (HQLA) and expected net cash outflows (NCOF ) above a given threshold l (more
on that in Section 2.6 below):
lm,t =
HQLAm,t
NCOFm,t
  l. (9)
The above liquidity coverage ratio is just a desired target of the bank under the Basel II scenario,
and there are no penalties if the bank does not comply with that ratio. On the contrary, immediate
corrective actions need to be undertaken under the Basel III setup to avoid constraints limiting
liquidity management and credit supply.
A bank’s demand and supply of liquidity arise from the above liquidity coverage ratio as follows.
If lm,t < l, the bank will demand liquidity, otherwise it will supply funds in the interbank market.
It follows that the liquidity supply (IBsupm,t) and demand (IB
dem
m,t ) of bank m in period t read as:
IBsupm,t =
(
1
l¯
HQLAm,t  NCOFm,t, if lm,t > l
0, otherwise
IBdemm,t =
(
l¯ ·NCOFm,t  HQLAm,t, if lm,t < l
0, otherwise
The interbank market is represented as a network of credit exposures among theM banks. Such
9In that case, a new bank owner is chosen among the depositors thus keeping the deposit composition bank
unchanged.
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a network is captured by the adjacency m⇥m matrix IBt denoting interbank exposures at time t:
IBt = IB
qk
t 2 Rm⇥m =
266666664
IB11t IB
12
t · · · IB1mt IB(L)1t
IB21t IB
22
t · · · IB2mt IB(L)2t
...
...
. . .
...
...
IBm1t IB
m2
t · · · IBmmt IB(L)mt
IB(A)1t IB(A)
2
t · · · IB(A)mt
377777775 (10)
Each entry IBqkt in the matrix corresponds to the amount borrowed by bank q from bank k.
Moreover, the elements of row q capture the q bank’s liabilities towards the other banks in the
market (IB(L)qt ), while the elements of the k column represent the interbank assets of bank k, i.e.
the claims of the k bank to the other banks (IB(A)kt ).
Similarly to real markets (see, e.g. Lazarow, 2011; BCBS, 2012) we assume that trading in the
interbank market is managed by a Central Clearing Counterparty (CCP), that matches demand and
supply on a pecking-order basis. First, banks demanding liquidity and those supplying liquidity are
sorted in descending order. In this way, the first bank on the demand side is the one with the largest
liquidity demand. Likewise, the first bank on the supply side is the one with the largest supply.
Next, the first liquidity demander is matched to all liquidity suppliers starting from the bank with
the largest liquidity supply, and then moving to the second if demand is not fully matched, etc.
The liquidity provided to a bank is subtracted from the total liquidity provided by a supplier. If
the interbank market does not fully satisfy liquidity demand, the bank demands the residual to
the Central Bank. Finally, once the liquidity demand of a bank is fully matched, the matching
algorithm moves to the second bank in the demand’s queue and the procedure is repeated. The
flow diagram in Figure 3 provides a visual idea of the procedure that we have just described.
As we said above unmet banks’ liquidity demands can be transferred to the Central Bank
liquidity desk. All the liquidity provided by the Central Bank must be secured against collateral
represented by government bonds. It follows that the ability of a bank to get liquidity depends
on the amount of unencumbered bonds it has in stock. More precisely, the maximum supply of
liquidity by the Central Bank to the bank m reads as:
LCBm,t = (1  f)Bm,t,
where f is a haircut rate that is homogeneous across all banks and Bm,t is the value of government
bonds in bank’s m balance sheet. The Central Bank charges an interest rate to the bank that is
higher than the one in the interbank market.
If a bank misses enough collateral to meet its residual liquidity demand, then it cannot fulfill
the liquidity coverage ratio. Under the Basel III, this implies that the bank will be considered as
troubled and therefore unable to supply credit until the requirement is fulfilled again.
For the determination of the interest rate on interbank loans, we follow a framework similar to
the one in Poole (1968); Whitesell (2006); Ennis and Weinberg (2007). The central bank sets a
10
Figure 3: Representation of the matching algorithm in the interbank market
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“corridor” for the interest rate charged on its lending and deposit facilities [i+ l, i  d], where i is
the policy rate defined according to the Taylor rule (details in Section 2.6), and  l > 0 and  d > 0
are the parameters defining the width of corridor. Note that in the case of symmetric corridor (i.e.,
baseline, narrow and wide)  l =  d while in asymmetric case  l 6=  d and  l >  d. The framework
is also in line with the real practice of the European Central Bank (Eser et al., 2012). The interbank
rate paid by a bank m on interbank loans includes a common component iIBcorr, which depends on
the excess supply of liquidity in the market and an idiosyncratic risk-premium component. Excess
supply for liquidity in the interbank market is defined as
⇥ =
Pm
k=1 IB
sup
k,t  
Pm
n=1 IB
dem
n,tPm
n=1 IB
dem
n,t
. (11)
The common component of the interbank rate will fall in the interval [i, i+ l] whenever ⇥ < 1. In
contrast, iIBcorr 2 [i    d, i] if ⇥ > 1. Finally, iIBcorr = i when ⇥ = 1. The risk-premium component
is instead denoted by "i, and it is a function of a bank’s financial soundness, as captured by its
debt-to-equity-ratio: "i = f(Debt/Equity), with f 0() > 0 (see Constantinides et al., 2002; Caballero
et al., 2017). We can summarize the determination of the interbank interest rate charged on the m
bank’s loans as follows:
ibm,t(i, "i,⇥) =
8><>:
i+ "i(t), if ⇥ = 1
i+  l   ◆ ⇤⇥+ "i(t), if ⇥ < 1
i   d + ◆ ⇤⇥ 1 + "i(t), if ⇥ > 1
(12)
with 0 < ◆ < 1 capturing banks’ propensity to lend.
Notice that when the interbank market operates in normal conditions, the interest rate fluctuates
in the corridor. However, as we shall show in more detail in Section 3.1 the market can also
experience a “freeze” whenever the average interest rate on interbank loans goes above the upper
bound of the central bank corridor. Market freezes occur in the model whenever the market has
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an excess demand for reserves and banks are highly leveraged so that the risk premiums skyrocket
in the market. It is worth noticing that such an extreme outcome is a true emergent property of
our model, and that it also captures some salient aspects of the interbank markets crisis in 2008.
2.6 Fiscal, monetary and macro-prudential policies
We now describe the policy framework of the model. It includes a Government levying taxes to
firms and recapitalizing failed banks, and a Central Bank that manages the interest rate and the
associated corridor, and that sets the macro-prudential rules banks must comply with.
Fiscal policy. The Government gathers a sales tax ⌧ from each transaction in the goods market.
Collected tax revenues are used to bail out failed banks. If the expenditure for bailouts exceeds
tax revenues, the government issues bonds that are bought by banks and (for the remainder, if
positive) by the central bank. The tax rate is adjusted at the end of every year considering the
dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio (see Appendix A for more details).
Monetary policy. The Central Bank performs monetary policy by setting the nominal interest rate
i every four weeks (“month”) in the simulation dynamics, according to two types of Taylor rule
(Taylor, 1993; Howitt, 1992).10 In the baseline scenario, the Central Bank follows a “dual-mandate”
Taylor rule (TR⇡,y):
ln(1 + it) = max{ln(1 + i⇤t ) + '⇡(ln(1 + ⇡t)  ln(1 + ⇡⇤)) + 'y((yt   y⇤t ), 0}, (13)
where (1+ ⇡t) is the inflation in the past 12 months, ⇡⇤ is the fixed inflation target, '⇡ and 'y are
fixed coe cients ('⇡ > 1 and 0 < 'y < 1 ),11 yt is the log GDP, y⇤t is the estimate of log potential
output by the Central bank and i⇤t = r⇤t + ⇡⇤, where r⇤t is evolving estimate of the “natural” real
interest rate. Having no information about the natural interest rate and the potential output, the
Central Bank estimates them adaptively. Accordingly, it adjusts r⇤ by employing an adjustment
speed ⌘r on the di↵erence between current and target inflation. It then estimates y⇤t using an
AR(1) model whose parameters are re-estimated right after r⇤ is adjusted. In the second scenario,
a three-mandate “leaning-against-the-wind” Taylor rule is used (TR⇡,y,c), which also takes into
account credit dynamics:
ln(1 + it) = max{ln(1 + i⇤t ) + '⇡(ln(1 + ⇡t)  ln(1 + ⇡⇤)) + 'y(yt   y⇤t ) + ln(
Ct
Ct 1
)'c , 0}, (14)
with '⇡ > 1, 0 < 'y < 1 and 0  'c  1. The presence of credit growth in the Taylor rule, as a
barometer of financial imbalances, constitutes the nexus between macro-prudential and monetary
policies (more on that in Verona et al., 2014; Lambertini et al., 2013).
10For more types of Taylor rules and their interactions with the macro-prudential framework, see Popoyan et al.
(2017).
11Adjustment parameters on output gap and inflation are set according Taylor’s original specification (Taylor,
1993) (see also Woodford (2001)).
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In addition to the nominal interest rate, the Central bank also manages the corridor for its
lending/deposit facility to banks, thus a↵ecting the fluctuations of the interbank interest rates (see
Section 2.5). It does this by tuning the  l > 0 and  d > 0 parameters (cf. Equation 12) that define
the corridor width on the basis of the chosen corridor window scenario: baseline, narrow, wide and
asymmetric (for details refer to Section 3.3.2).
Macro-prudential policy. The pre-crisis financial regulation framework focused only on the safety
and soundness of the balance sheet of each financial institution. The troubles associated with the
global financial crisis of 2007/2008 accelerated the reform of such a framework that is now “macro-
prudential”, as it looks at the systemic dimensions of risks arising from banks. Macro-prudential
policy aims at the following intermediate goals: (i) increasing the resilience of the financial system
to systemic shocks; (ii) containing the build-up of systemic imbalances by reducing pro-cyclicality of
credit, creating liquidity bu↵ers and restraining the leverage in the system; (iii) reducing structural
vulnerabilities in financial system that arise throughout common exposures, interlinkages, and
position of individual financial intermediaries (Hanson et al., 2011). The above objectives are the
target of the Basel III regulatory package (see BCBS, 2011) delivered by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS).
One main goal in this paper is to compare the e ciency of these new regulatory schemes in terms
of higher resilience of the banking sector and study their interactions with monetary policy. We
start by describing the Basel II scenario, and then we move to the description of each component in
the Basel III package. The apex in the expressions of the various regulatory constraints (respectively
2 or 3) indicates whether a regulatory constraint belongs either to the Basel II or to the Basel III
framework.
Basel II is the baseline scenario in the model. Such a regulatory framework comprises only the
capital adequacy ratio (CAR2), requiring banks to keep a level of total capital (TC) at least equal
to a fixed 8% of their risk-weighted assets (RWA):
CAR2m,t =
TCm,t
RWAm,t
=
E(T1)m,t + E(T2)m,t
Lsm,t + SCm,t + 0, 2 ⇤ IBm,t
  ✏2, (15)
where RWA corresponds to the sum of assets adjusted each with corresponding risk weights to
determine bank’s exposure to potential losses.12 The banks total capital (TCm,t) is the sum of
Tier 1 (E(T1)) and Tier 2 (E(T2)) equities. While E(T1) is the core capital, E(T2) represents the
supplementary capital, that is earnings form liquidations in firesale market and evaluations.
The Basel III macro-prudential framework attempts to reduce systemic risk stemming from
financial institutions by introducing global capital requirements and global liquidity requirements.
The former focuses on creating a capital cushion for bad times and by limiting excess leverage. The
latter aims at creating a liquidity cushion in case of a market liquidity dry-up.
12Following the standardized approach in Basel II and Basel III regulatory setups, loans to shops and seized
collateral are weighted with 100%, cash, and government bonds are assigned zero risk weight, whereas interbank
lending is weighted with 20%.
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The global capital requirement part is based on three constraints that banks need to comply
with: 1) the static minimum capital requirement, 2) the counter-cyclical capital bu↵er on the top
of the latter, 3) the leverage ratio.
1. The static minimum capital requirement (CAR3) improves on CAR2 as it focuses on the
high-quality components of banks’ capital, i.e., the core capital Tier 1, composed by equity
capital and net profits, taken as a ratio of total capital:
CAR3m,t =
T ier1m,t
RWAm,t
=
E(T1)bm,t
 IBIBm,t +  LLsm,t +  SCSCm,t
  ✏3,
where ✏3 = 4.5%.
2. The counter-cyclical capital bu↵er (CCB) is added to the CAR3 with the aim of preventing
excess aggregate credit growth (see Borio and Zhu, 2012; Shim, 2013; Hessou et al., 2017).
In our model, the CCB is computed in three steps: (i) we calculate the credit-to-GDP ratio;
(ii) we estimate the credit-to-GDP gap as the di↵erence between the current credit-to-GDP
ratio and its long-run trend;13 (iii) we calculate the capital bu↵er add-on as a function of the
credit-to-GDP gap according to the following expression:
 = CCBm,t =
8><>:
0, if Gt < J
(Gt J)
(H J) ⇤ 0.025, if J  Gt  H
0.025, if Gt > H
where 0    0.025. Notice that the size of the bu↵er (expressed in a percentage of risk-
weighted assets) is zero when the credit-to-GDP gap (Gt) is under the (“safe”) threshold J .
Above this floor the bu↵er add-on increases with credit-to-GDP gap until the latter reaches
the ceiling H.14 Then it remains constant at the upper bound of 2.5%.
3. The leverage requirement (LR) is meant to restrain excess leverage in the banking sector,
thus providing a further layer of protection against excessive risk-taking by banks (Dermine,
2015; Jarrow, 2013):15
LRm,t =
T ier1m,t
TotalAssetsm,t
=
E(T1)bm,t
Lsm,t + SC
b
m,t +B
b
m,t +H
b
m,t + IBm,t
  ↵,
with ↵ = 3%.
13We assume that credit-to-GDP follows a linear trend based on an OLS estimate of 5 years. The regression
coe cients are updated recursively using the previous data from the beginning of the observation period (5 periods)
until the end of 60 years. The trend forecast is conducted on yearly bases.
14The empirical analysis based on banking crisis historical data held in BIS evidence the sensitivity and robustness
of adjustment factor J = 2 and H = 10.
15The results of the policy mix and e ciency of leverage requirement in many ways repeat the policy conclusions
of Popoyan et al. (2017), and thus absent policy results in the main body of the paper to facilitate the readability of
results while presented in Appendix D.
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Figure 4: The time series of output, inflation and real interest rate (50 years).
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The global liquidity requirement is achieved in the Basel III framework via the liquidity coverage
ratio (LCR) introduced in Section 2.5, cf. Eq. 9. The main objective of the LCR is to promote
liquidity resilience by requiring banks to hold enough unencumbered high-quality liquid assets
(HQLA) to withstand a stress scenario of cash outflows NCOF over four weeks. In Basel III the
liquidity coverage ratio (l) should be equal to one. This implies that the level of high-quality assets
must fully meet the level of net expected cash flows.16 Thus, a relevant di↵erence between Basel II
and Basel III frameworks is that the latter also focuses on banks’ liquidity profiles.
3 Simulation results and policy experiments
Similarly to other agent-based models, the high-dimensionality of the dynamical system represent-
ing the economy prevents one from obtaining a closed form solution for state variables. Thus, we
analyze the model via computer simulations by running extensive Monte Carlo simulation exper-
iments composed of 150 independent runs, whose time span covers sixty years. The values of the
parameters of the model are spelled out in Table 3 in Appendix B.
Before employing the model to investigate interactions between macro-prudential and monetary
policies, we evaluate its ability to replicate a wide set of macroeconomic stylized facts in the
benchmark scenario (for a discussion of empirical validation of agent-based models, see Fagiolo
et al., 2017b). For this reason, Figure 4 shows the time series of inflation, interest rate, and output
generated by the model in a typical simulation.17 Furthermore, like its predecessor Popoyan et al.
16Basel III also distinguishes between di↵erent types of high-quality assets that enter in the calculation of liquidity
coverage ratio. In Appendix A we provide more details about these asset groups and the determination of the liquidity
cover ratio in our model.
17The time series are depicted from the 11th year since the first 10 years are accounted as transient because of the
learning process. Vertical left axis measures real interest rate and inflation, while the right horizontal the aggregate
output.
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(2017), the model is able to replicate a wide array of macroeconomic stylized facts, ranging from the
volatilities and cross-correlation structure of the main macroeconomic variables, to the emergence
of empirical regularities such as like the Okun’s law and the Phillips curve.18
Finally, the presence of the interbank market allows us to study how the financial instability
originated by credit relationships among banks impact on credit to firms and thus on the perfor-
mance of the whole economy. In the next section, we focus on the possible emergence of liquidity
freezes in the interbank market. Then, in Sections 3.2, we analyze the impact of di↵erent macro-
prudential and monetary policies on financial and economic stability. Finally, we design and test
the impact of new policies tools targeting liquidity fluctuations in the interbank market (cf. Section
3.3).
3.1 The anatomy of liquidity freezes in the interbank market
Our model endogenously generates interbank liquidity freezes. This is for instance shown by the
evolution of interbank rates through 50 years, plotted in Figure 5. In normal times, the interbank
interest rate dynamics closely follows that of the Central Bank policy rate. The Central Bank is
thus able to transmit monetary policy impulses to the whole economy via the interbank market
rate. Nevertheless, the interbank interest rate dynamics is also punctuated by large positive spikes
corresponding to liquidity freezes. The latter occurs whenever banks with excess liquidity decide
to hoard it instead of lending to banks in a shortage of liquid assets (see Section 2.5 above).
Figure 6 takes a more in-depth look at the anatomy of one of these freezes, by plotting the
dynamics of the interbank rate in the 42nd year together with the Central Bank policy rate, the
lower and upper bound of the corridor and the dynamics of excess supply in the interbank market.
In the presence of excess demand for liquidity (corresponding to negative values of the excess
supply), the interest rate skyrockets. It follows that interest spikes result from a large unsatisfied
demand for liquidity in the interbank market, in line with the dynamics observed during the 2008
financial crisis.
Furthermore, to better understand the e↵ect of the Central Bank’s lending facility on interest
rates, we also run a counterfactual simulation experiment where the bank is prevented from in-
tervening during interbank market freezes. As Figure 7 shows, the absence of the Central Bank’s
liquidity backstop facility puts the interbank interest rate on an irreversible explosive dynamics as
soon as an excess demand for liquidity passes a critical tipping point. It follows that the lending and
deposit facility of the Central Bank is fundamental to allow the interbank market to recover from
a liquidity freeze, thus transmitting monetary policy impulses and preventing financial instability
from a↵ecting credit, and via the financial accelerator, the real economy.
18We refer the reader to the Popoyan et al. (2017) for a complete discussion of the di↵erent macroeconomic stylized
facts replicated by our model. Naturally, the empirical validation results are also available from the authors upon
request.
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Figure 5: Interbank rate dynamics through 600 months
Figure 6: Interbank rate dynamics and excess supply in 42nd year
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Figure 7: Interbank rate dynamics and excess supply in 42nd year when Central Bank does not act
as lender of last resort.
3.2 Macro-prudential and monetary policy interactions
Let us now analyze the interactions between monetary and macro-prudential policies. The bar
plots in Figures 8a and 8b provide an overview of the macroeconomic impact of di↵erent policy
combinations. In addition, the radar plots in Figures 9a and 9b show the impact of the same combi-
nations of monetary and macro-prudential rules on several dimensions capturing the vulnerability
of the banking sector. Notice that larger (smaller) polygons in these figures indicate a more (less)
vulnerable financial sector (see Aikman et al., 2017, for more details).19
Figures 8 and 9 indicate that the Basel III framework improves the macro performance of the
economy and stabilize the banking sector. In particular, it has a significant impact on the output
gap (see the Figure 8a), the average unemployment (Figure 8b), the likelihood of economic crises,
and the bank failure rates, that are lower than in the Basel II setup (details in Appendix D). At
the same time, not all levers of Basel III have a positive impact on financial and macroeconomic
dynamics. In particular, both the bar and radar plots reveal that the standalone implementation
of either static liquidity (LCR) or capital (CAR3) requirements produce worse performances than
in the Basel II scenario for all kind of monetary policy rules considered. Only the introduction
of counter-cyclical capital bu↵ers (CCB), can compensate for the adverse e↵ects of static capital
and liquidity requirements. Indeed, the introduction of such a dynamic bu↵er improves both the
macro performance and financial stability as compared to standalone CAR3 and LCR. Moreover,
the results delivered by CAR3 + CCB setup (especially in case of dual-mandate Taylor rule) are
not far away from the Basel III one. The latter finding supports the claims in Haldane (2012) and
19Finally, the tables in Appendix D complement these findings by providing results also for the likelihood of
macroeconomic crises, as well as for interactions with the di↵erent corridor regimes explored in the previous section.
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Figure 8: Bar plot comparison of normalized values of macroeconomic variables across di↵erent
monetary policies and macro-prudential tools
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Note: The figure presents bar charts of the six components of macro-prudential regulation. Blue
bar: dual-mandate Taylor rule (TR); red bar: “leaning-against-the-wind” (TR). Each data point
is normalized with respect to the Basel II baseline scenario.
Aikman et al. (2014), which advocate for simpler regulatory rules.
As far as specific monetary rules are concerned, Figures 8 and 9 show that a leaning-against-the-
wind monetary policy outperforms, a dual-mandate Taylor rule in most scenarios, by generating
both better macroeconomic performance and a less vulnerable banking sector.
The above results point in general to the high complementarity between monetary policy and
macro-prudential policies in delivering both a more stable macroeconomic and banking dynamics
(Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2016). This indicates the absence of a potential conflict between price
and financial stability faced by Central Banks (see, e.g. Howitt, 2011). Moreover, our results are
in line with the Tinbergen rule (see Tinbergen, 1964) dictating that policy-makers require as many
instruments (in this case two: interest rate policy and macro-prudential regulation) as objectives
(macroeconomic and financial stability) for e↵ective policy results.20
To shed light on the mechanisms generating the results on monetary and macro-prudential
interactions, we report in Table 1 the dynamic cross-correlations between GDP and total credit
on the one hand, and the main regulatory levers of Basel III (LCR, CAR3, CAR3+CCB) on the
other hand.21 The table reveals first the presence of a financial accelerator at work in our model.
20One important exception to the above general pattern is represented by the interaction between the leaning-
against-the-wind monetary rule and the counter-cyclical capital bu↵er (CCB). Figures 8a and 8b indeed reveal that
the joint use of dynamic capital requirements and the three-mandate “Leaning-against-the-wind” delivers a worse
macroeconomic performance than the combination of CCB and Dual-mandate Taylor rule. This result is in line with
Aiyar et al. (2014) and it stems from the excess credit contraction generated by the joint adoption of two policy
instruments sharing the same objective, i.e., reducing the pro-cyclicality of credit.
21We report results only for the leaning-against-the-wind Taylor rule scenario. However, results are similar under
the dual-mandate Taylor rule.
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Figure 9: Radar plot of financial vulnerability of banking sector in dual-mandate and “leaning-
against-the-wind” Taylor rule.
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Note: The figure presents radar charts of the six components underlying six indexes of financial
vulnerability. Radar is within the five color categories representing standalone financial regulation
tools and combination between them. Bank leverage is measured as bank assets to capital; maturity
mismatch is loan-to-deposit ratio; size of financial sector is computed as the ratio between financial
sector assets to GDP; concentration measure is the ratio between assets of top 5 banks and assets
of the whole financial system.
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Table 1: Cross-correlation structure of output, credit and financial regulation tools
Variable t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
GDP 0.3612 0.6407 0.8916 1.0000 0.8916 0.6407 0.3612
Tot. Credit -0.0504 0.1140 0.2526 0.4017 0.5419 0.6331 0.4204
LCR 0.0821 0.1524 0.2219 0.1824 0.1321 0.0874 0.0151
CAR 0.0821 0.1524 0.2219 0.2924 0.2321 0.1574 0.0551
CAR+CCB 0.2144 0.1405 0.0452 -0.0854 -0.1721 -0.2323 -0.1584
Note: Cross-correlations are computed for the LAW -“leaning-against-the-wind” monetary rule.
Figure 10: Counter-cyclical liquidity bu↵er and credit pro-cyclicality
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Simulated series have been detrended with HP filter (  = 1600) series. Average cross-correlations
from a Monte Carlo of size 100.
Indeed, total credit is highly pro-cyclical and leading. Furthermore, the static capital (CAR3) and
liquidity (LCR) requirements are positively correlated with GDP at most leads and lags. It follows
that these instruments amplify real fluctuations, as they contribute to reinforcing the credit cycle.
In contrast, the combination of static and dynamic capital requirements (CAR3+CCB) is inversely
correlated with GDP at positive leads, as these instruments dampen the pro-cyclicality of credit in
the model.
3.3 New policy tools for taming interbank market instability
The flexibility and modularity of our agent-based model also allow testing the impact of new policy
instruments that can possibly be used to tame instability in the banking sector. We focus on
dynamic liquidity requirements and active interest-rate corridor management. The first policy tool
can be considered an additional lever of the Basel III macro-prudential framework to mitigate the
21
pro-cyclicality of the static LCR (cf. Section 3.3.1). The second policy measure requires the Central
Bank to actively manage the spread between the lending and deposit facilities interest rates, thus
restricting or widening the interbank rate corridor with the aim of dampening liquidity fluctuations
(see Section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Dynamic liquidity requirements
In the previous section, we find that a standalone static liquidity requirement is the worst macro-
prudential tool, as it contributes to amplify the strains produced by credit fluctuations. This
goes against the original objective of the LCR to force banks to hold a bu↵er of liquid assets as
a defense against liquidity distress. This logic overlooks possible vicious spirals triggered by the
attempts of banks to meet liquidity requirements regardless of the credit cycle (see, e.g. Li et al.,
2017; Duijm and Wierts, 2016). Indeed, pro-cyclical risk-taking over the financial cycle decreases
liquidity bu↵ers in good times to the regulatory minimum. However, a binding LCR forces banks to
increase their share of high-quality liquid assets during an economic downswing, thereby reducing
the share of corporate and interbank loans (see also Duijm and Wierts, 2016).22 Such a behavior
amplifies credit contractions with the result of increasing firm bankruptcy rates and the share of
non-performing loans. In addition, it also reduces the supply of liquidity on the interbank market,
thus aggravating liquidity problems of other banks.
E↵ective liquidity requirements ought to take into account the possible feedback e↵ects existing
between liquidity requirements and the credit cycle. To test the validity of this hypothesis, we
carry out a simulation experiment, where we complement the static LCR with a counter-cyclical
liquidity bu↵er (CLB, which follows the same logic of the CCB capital requirement add-on). More
specifically, the CLB takes into account the credit-to-GDP gap Gt, according to the following rule:
µ = CLBm,t =
8>>>><>>>>:
 0.2, if Gt < J
(Gt J)
(M J) ⇤ ( 0.2), if J  Gt M
(Gt M)
(H M) ⇤ 0.2, if M < Gt  H
0.2, if Gt > H,
where  0.2  µ  0.2 and M = (J + H)/2. Notice that the CLB implies a reduction of the
liquidity bu↵er LCR by 20% whenever the credit-to-GDP gap falls below the minimum threshold
J (negative bu↵er). The same rule implies an extra liquidity bu↵er that grows as a function of the
credit-to-GDP gap until the latter reaches the ceiling H. When the upper threshold is met, the
counter-cyclical liquidity bu↵er add-on increases the LCR by 20%.
The macroeconomic and bank performance delivered by the counter-cyclical liquidity bu↵er is
highlighted by the orange line in the radar plot of Figure 9. The introduction of the CLB allows
significant improvements in the stability of the banking sector. Indeed, the performance of a macro-
22Banerjee and Hio (2014) find that under tight liquidity requirement UK banks alter the composition of their
assets and liabilities, significantly increasing their share of high-quality liquid assets. The increased stock of HQLA
is matched by an almost equal reduction in the share of intra-banks loans.
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prudential regulation grounded only on the LCR with CLB is not far (and for some dimensions,
better) from the obtained combining static and dynamic capital requirements. The reason for such
an improvement is explained by the dynamic cross-correlation plot in Figure 10. The introduction
of the CLB makes liquidity requirements negatively correlated with GDP at positive leads. This
indicates that liquidity requirements now contribute to dampening the economic and credit cycles,
instead of reinforcing them.
3.3.2 Active interbank rate corridor management
In all the policy experiments discussed so far, the Central Bank fixes the interest rate (i) according
to some form of Taylor rule and then determines the interest rates on lending and deposit facilities
by applying a symmetric mark-up and mark-down   to the policy rate. This determines the corridor
wherein the interbank rate fluctuates. What happens if the size of the corridor shrinks, growth,
or it becomes asymmetric? More generally, can the Central Bank use the width of the corridor
to stabilize financial and economic dynamics? This is what we study in our last battery of policy
experiments. More specifically, we consider four scenarios for the interest rate corridor: “baseline”,
“narrow”, “wide” and “asymmetric”:
1. Baseline corridor: [it   0.7%, it + 0.7%],
2. Narrow corridor: [it   0.5%, it + 0.5%],
3. Wide corridor: [it   1%, it + 1%],
4. Asymmetric corridor: [it   0.2%, it + 0.6]23.
A detailed account of the results of experiments simulating the impact of monetary and macro-
prudential policy mix under the above corridor regimes is provided in Appendix D. We find that,
in most combinations of macro-prudential and interest-rate rules, an asymmetric corridor regime
together with a narrow corridor yields better macroeconomic performance.
What are the mechanisms driving such results? The corridor system should help to reduce
the volatility of overnight interest rates, by keeping them close to the policy rate and eliminating
any chance of persistent upward or downward biases (Lee, 2016). Indeed, highly volatile overnight
interest rates can jeopardize financial stability and the e↵ective implementation of monetary policy,
with the result of exacerbating macroeconomic fluctuations. Table 2 reports the ratio between the
average volatility of the interbank interest rates, the output gap and the inflation rate in the di↵erent
corridor scenarios. A value higher than one in the table indicates that the volatility is higher in that
specific scenario vis-a´-vis the benchmark one. The table suggests that widening (narrowing) the
interest rate corridor has a destabilizing (stabilizing) e↵ect on all aggregate variables considered.
Besides, introducing an asymmetric corridor also has a positive impact on the interbank interest
23Note that our choice to rely on a particular type of asymmetry, in our case wide credit facility and narrow
deposit facility, is motivated by real-world practical setups (e.g., Turkey, EU under floor operating system).
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Table 2: Normalized values of volatilities in interbank rate, output gap and inflation for di↵erent
corridor scenarios.
Baseline Wide Narrow Asymmetric
Interbank interest 1 2.8581⇤ 0.7641⇤⇤ 0.7204⇤⇤⇤
rate (0.1674) (0.0901) (0.0875)
Output gap 1 1.6093⇤⇤ 0.9115⇤ 0.8702⇤⇤
(0.0594) (0.0688) (0.6421)
Inflation 1 1.0351⇤ 0.9873⇤⇤⇤ 0.9805⇤
rate (0.0784) (0.1014) (0.0946)
aNote: Absolute value of the simulation t-statistic of H0: ”no di↵erence between
baseline and the experiment” in parentheses; (***) significant at 1% level; (**)
significant at 5% level; (*) significant at 10% level.
rate as well as on macroeconomic variables. Indeed, all volatility statistics considered are lower in
the asymmetric and narrow corridor regime than in the baseline scenario. In the latter regimes,
the higher reliance of banks on Central Bank funds implies a reduction in the interbank market
volatility. The foregoing results are in line with the recent experience in Turkey (see, e.g. Kara,
2016; Aysan et al., 2014; Alper et al., 2013), and suggest that an active interest-rate corridor
management can e↵ectively work as additional unconventional monetary measure along targeted
macro-prudential policies to reduce the volatility of short-term money market, thus lessening the
trade-o↵s posed by volatile financial flows and improving the macroeconomic environment (see Lee,
2016, for more details).
4 Conclusions
We extended the macroeconomic agent-based model in Popoyan et al. (2017) by adding an interbank
market where financial institutions can trade liquidity, and we studied the emergence of market
freezes akin to those observed during the 2008 financial crisis. We then used the model to simulate
the impact of di↵erent combinations of macro-prudential constraints (e.g., Basel II vs. III and the
di↵erent levers of the latter) and monetary policy rules (dual-mandate vs. leaning-against-the-wind
Taylor rules). Finally, we tested the impact of new policy tools involving active interest corridor
management or counter-cyclical liquidity bu↵er.
The model endogenously generates business fluctuations amplified by the financial accelerator
mechanism. Moreover, rare interbank market freezes worsen the balance sheets of banks, thus
reducing their credit supply and increasing financial instability. In these cases, if the Central Bank
does not provide enough liquidity to the interbank market acting as a lender of last resort, the
impact on the real dynamics of the economics is significant. The interactions between monetary
policy and macro-prudential regulation suggest that the best policy mix involves a “leaning-against-
the-wind” Taylor rule accounting for credit dynamics as well, combined with a fully-fledged Basel
III framework. This result also confirms the validity of the Tinbergen principle: two instruments
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(interest rate policy and macro-prudential regulation) are needed to achieve both macroeconomic
and financial stability. We also examined in detail the impact of the di↵erent regulatory levers
of the Basel III framework, and we found that the good performance of the latter mainly stems
from the combination of static and dynamic capital requirements. In contrast, a static liquidity
requirement, as the one implied by the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) in Basel III, increases
financial instability, as it induces pro-cyclical liquidity management by banks that amplify strains
both in the interbank market and in the provision of credit to the real economy. The aforementioned
adverse e↵ects of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio can be dampened by coupling the latter with a
counter-cyclical liquidity bu↵er add-on. Finally, we also studied the impact of an active interbank
rate corridor management by the Central Bank, and we found that the width and asymmetry of
the corridor have important financial stability implications (Li et al., 2017) and could be considered
a new unconventional monetary policy tools.
The model can be extended in several ways. First, relying on the dynamic network between
firms and banks, one could study how its evolution is a↵ected by di↵erent combinations of macro-
prudential and monetary policies. Second, one could study how the emergence of too-big-to-fail
and too-connected-to-fail banks poses a threat to the stability of financial markets, possibly leading
to deep downturns. Relatedly, one could examine specific policies targeting systemically important
banks, involving, e.g., extra capital surcharges.
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Appendix A The model
The appendix presents the comprehensive structure of the real side of the model and of the fiscal policy
discussed in Section 2 of the paper. We start with the shop entry procedure and the process of price and
wage formation. We also discuss in detail the the budget planning and portfolio choices of each type of agent
and search-and-matching mechanisms in labor and goods markets. Finally, we present the equations related
to fiscal policy as well as the computation of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio.
A.1 The real side of the economy
Shop entry in the model is a two-steps process: first a potential shop owner needs to pay a fixed set-up cost
S (expressed in units of shop owner’s consumption good) with a stock of available liquid resources (money,
deposit, credit).24 If the potential entrepreneur can a↵ord to pay a setup cost she passes to a profitability
test. She randomly chooses the mark-up (µi,t) and the sales target (y
trg
i,t ), and computes the price and the
expected profits.25 The price pnori,t is equal to
pnori,t =
(1 + µi,t)
(1  ⌧) wi,t, (16)
where ⌧ is the sales tax rate and wi,t stands for the wage rate.
The flow of profit from entry, ⇧i,t, is calculated as follows:
⇧i,t = wi,t(µi,ty
trg
i,t   (F   1))  wi,tiDt (ytrgi,t + F   1) > 0, (17)
where F stands for fixed cost (expressed in units of type i labor) and wi,t is the wage rate. If ⇧i,t > 0, the
potential shop owner makes a job o↵er to an unemployed worker informing her about the wage she is ready
to pay. The wage rate is defined as follows:
wi,t =Wt(1 + ⇡
⇤)
 +1
2 , (18)
whereWt,   and ⇡⇤ are average wage rate across all shops computed as a ration between aggregate wage and
aggregate employment at time t, fixed contract period and Central Bank’s target inflation rate respectively.26
The unemployed agent in a job search will accept the o↵er of shop owner if the proposed wage is more then
her e↵ective wage (described in Equation 21 below): wefft < wi,t/(1 + ⇡
⇤).
In addition, the potential show owner makes an o↵er to a possible consumer (i.e., a randomly chosen
agent whose primary consumption good coincides with the entrepreneur’s production good) with the price
she will charge for the product. The price that entrepreneur would charge (pnori,t ) is defined as follows:
pnori,t =
(1 + µi,t)
(1  ⌧) wi,t, (19)
where µi,t is the mark-up and ⌧ stands for tax rate.The potential consumer will accept the shop owner’s
proposal if the price pnori,t is less than the consumer’s e↵ective price (p
eff
t ): p
eff
t > p
nor
i,t /(1 + ⇡
⇤)
Shops during their life will continue setting prices with the normal pricing rule stated in Eq. 19 except
when the sales target is too far from shop inventories. More precisely, if the inventory-to-sales ratio rises
much above its upper critical threshold (IS) a shop will cut its price by   1p , and on the contrary, it will
24Note that credit is equal to 0 if the agent did not receive a credit in the previous period, and to Ph,t(S + Ii,t)
otherwise, where I is the potential entrepreneur’s stock of inventories and Ph is the haircut price discussed later in
Equation 6.
25The mark-up µi,t is drawn from a uniform distribution over the support [0; 2µ], where µ is the average percentage
mark-up over variable costs wi,t. The latter is extracted from a uniform distribution over [1;n].
26The inflation target is set equal to 3% – U.S. average for the period of 1984-2006 period.
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push the price up by  p if the inventories-to-sales ratio falls below the minimum (IS 1) threshold:
pi,t =
8<:
pnori,t ⇤  p, if I < ytrgi,t ⇤ IS 1
pnori,t ⇤   1p if I > ytrgi,t ⇤ IS
pnori,t , otherwise
Accordingly the frequency of price changes is endogenous in the model.
The shop fails and exits the market if the value of its outstanding loans is higher than its financial wealth:
Asi,t = H
s
i,t +D
s
i,t + Ph,t ⇤ Ii,t   Lsi,t < 0
A.2 Budget planning and portfolio choices
Agents adjust their permanent income by using the following adaptive rule:
 Y pz,t =  p(Yz,t   Y pz,t 1),
where Yz, Y pz and  p are, respectively, the financial wealth, permanent income, and the adjustment speed
parameter.
The financial wealth of a worker is:
Yc,t = Hc,t +Dc,t + Pf ⇤ Ic,t,
where Hc,t are cash holdings, Dc,t stands for bank deposits and Pf ⇤ Ic,t is the value of inventories in the
fire-sale market.
The financial wealth of shop owner is:
Ys,t = H
s,t +Ds,t   Ls,t,
where Hs,t are cash holdings , Ds,t stands for bank deposits and Ls,t are outstanding loans.
Finally, the financial wealth of a bank owner whose bank is not troubled reads as:
Yb,t = Hb,t + (E
b
m,t   ✏b(Lsm,t + SCm,t + 0.2IBm,t),
In the above expression Hb denotes cash holdings and (Ebm,t   ✏u(Lsm,t + SCbm,t +0.2IBbm,t) denotes instead
the bank’s equity after subtracting regulatory capital.27 .
Let us now consider the portfolio choices of a worker. A worker holds Hcz in cash and D
c
z in deposits and
must choose the amount of deposits Dcz and money H
c
z to fund their consumption plans given the constraint:
Dcz,t = (1 + i
D
t )(H
c
z,t +D
c
z,t  Hcz,t).
If CEj,t  Hz,t + Dz,t, then the worker fixes CEz,t = Hz,t and leaves the residual in her bank account.
Otherwise, CEz,t = Hz,t = Hz,t +Dz,t.
Next consider the budget planning for a bank owner.If the bank owned is troubled, consumption expen-
ditures CEz are constrained by current cash holdings Hz. If the cash owned is more than CEz, the bank
owner deposits the di↵erence Hz,t CEz,t in her bank account. Otherwise, CEz,t = Hz,t = Hz,t. If the bank
owned is not troubled and CEz,t  Az,t, the owner sets Hz,t = CEz,t and leaves the di↵erence Az,t  CEz,t
in bank equity. Otherwise, Hz,t = CEz,t = Az,t.
Finally, consider the portfolio management of a shop owner. Except for money (Hz) and deposits (Dz),
a shop owner can apply for a loan (Lz). If the shop has already a currently rolling credit and her bank is
not troubled, her credit limit will be equivalent to the haircut value of her eligible collateral (determined in
27The balance-sheets of all the types of agents are reported in Table 4 in Appendix C. Notice that the model is
stock-flow consistent (see, e.g., the seminal contribution of Godley and Lavoie, 2007).
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Eq. 6). Consequently, the financial constraint of a shop owner’s is as follows:
Hz,t  Hz,t = Dz,t   Dz,t1+iDt +
Lz,t
1+itL   Lz,t,
Lz,t  Ph,t(It + S)(1 + iLt ).
where Hz,t   0, Dz,t   0, Lz,t   0 and where Hz, Dz and Lz are respectively, the current levels of cash,
deposits, and bank loans. The above-mentioned constraints are met, and the loan is paid if Hz,t +Dz,t +
Ph,t(It + S)   Lz,t.
A.3 Labor and good market trading
We now turn to describe the search-and-matching algorithms governing interactions in labor and goods
markets.
Labor market. The wage of shop is set according to Equation 20. Incumbent shops update their wages at
the end of each period. First, shops compute their own sales target ytrgi,t , by setting it equal to past sales.
Then, they update their wages every   periods on the basis of the following rule:
w = w
h⇣
1 +  
⇣
xtrg/xpot   1
⌘⌘
(1 + ⇡⇤)
i /48
, (20)
where w, xtrg and xpot are correspondingly the current wage, the average input target and potential input
covering the past   periods, and   is responsible for the degree of wage (and price) flexibility in our artificial
economy.
Employees exchange their labor endowment for an e↵ective wage:
wefft = min(wi,t, Hi,t), (21)
where H is the cash the shop owner has available. The shop accepts the o↵er of the worker unless its labor
input exceeds its target and the ratio of the inventory-to-sales target (IS) exceeds the critical threshold value
IS > 1. Shop owners are self-employed, and they use their endowment as an input.
Goods market. Consumers gather information about the selling price of both their primary and secondary
consumption goods (ps, s = 1, 2) and, based on their cash-in-advance constraint pc 6 H, they send orders for
the amount cs. Shops sell an amount ceff = min(cs, I) considering their level of inventories (I). Consumers
pay an e↵ective price equal to peffs = pscs/c
eff
s . Consumers choose their desired consumption bundle (c1; c2)
to maximize the utility function below subject to p1c1 + p2c2 = E budget constraint:
u(c1, c2) = c
"/("+1)
1 + c
"/("+1)
2 , (22)
where " > 0 stands for the demand parameter.
A.4 Fiscal policy
The Government charges a sales tax ⌧ on every transaction in the goods markets. The Government adjusts
⌧ considering the dynamics of debt-to-GDP ratio. In particular, the Government initially estimates its debt
relative to annual estimated potential output y⇤ (corresponding to the level of output in full-employment).
Next, it sets the new tax rate equal to ⌧⇤ as follows:
⌧t = ⌧
⇤ +  ⌧
✓
Bt
Pt(1 + im,t)(48ey
⇤)
  b⇤
◆
, (23)
where B, P ,  ⌧ and 1+ im are respectively the total stock of government bonds, the current price level, the
adjustment parameter and weekly interest rate. The tax rate in Eq. 23 is the one that leaves the debt-to-
GDP ratio stationary in the full-employment equilibrium, plus an adjustment factor based on the di↵erence
between the actual debt-to-GDP and targeted b⇤.
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A.5 Computation of the liquidity coverage ratio
In line with Basel III regulatory accord, we consider both Level 1 and Level 2 of high-liquid assets, HQLA,
in the computation of the liquidity coverage ratio. Level 1 assets are composed by cash-money Hbt and by
Government bonds Bbm,t. Level 2 assets include only interbank loans in our model. They can contribute to
HQLA with a haircut of 15% on their value and up to the limit of two-thirds of the value of Level 1 assets.28
It follows that the expression for HQLA in our model reads as:
HQLAm,t = B
b
m,t +H
b
m,t +min

0.85IBbm,t;
2
3
⇤ (Hbm,t +Bbm,t)
 
.
Expected net cash outflows (NCOF ) are computed by weighting liabilities and assets by the corresponding
run-o↵ (for liabilities) and default (assets).29 Let O
b( )
t and O
b(+)
t indicate the current contractual cash
outflows and inflows of the bank. Expected cash outflows, Ex[Ob
( )
t ], and expected cash inflows, Ex[O
b(+)
t ],
are then calculated as follows:
Ex[Ob
( )
m,t ] = O
b( )
m,t +
nX
e=1
#eLiab
e
m,t = O
 
m,t + #D(D
s
m,t +D
c
m,t) + #cbL
cb
m,t + #ib IBm,t
Ex[Ob
(+)
m,t ] = O
b(+)
m,t  
nX
a=1
#aAsset
a
m,t = O
+
m,t   #sL + #HHbm,t + #bBbm,t,
where #D = 0.1, #cb = 0.25, #  = 1 are the run-o↵ rates of liabilities, and #sL = 0.5 , #H = 0 and
#b = 0.2 are the default rates of assets as specified in the Basel III accord. Accordingly, NCOFm,t =
Ex[Ob
( )
m,t ] min(Ex[Ob
(+)
m,t ; 0, 75 ⇤ [Ob
( )
m,t ]).
28All assets included in the HQLA calculation must be unencumbered (e.g. not pledged as collateral) and opera-
tional (e.g. not used as a hedge on trading positions). Finally, Level 2 assets must be limited to 40% of banks total
HQLA.
29Note that run-o↵ rates of liabilities and default rates of assets are the same for all the banks and are defined by
the Basel committee of bank supervision (see BCBS, 2013; Keister and Bech, 2012).
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Appendix B Parameters
Table 3: Parameters of the model
Parameter Description Value
Macro-prudential Regulation Parameters
↵ Leverage requirement 0.03
l Liquidity requirement 1
✏2 Minimum capital requirement in Basel II 0.08
✏3 Minimum capital requirement in Basel III 0.045
 Counter-cyclical capital bu↵er [0, 0.025]
µ Counter-cyclical liquidity bu↵er [ 0.2, 0.2]
#D Run-o↵ rate of deposit 0.1
#cb Run-o↵ rate of central bank loan 0.25
#ib Run-o↵ rate of interbank loan 1
#L Run-o↵ rate of commercial loan 0.5
#B Run-o↵ rate of gov. bonds 0.2
Banks Parameters
 Quick ratio 0.5
% Debt-to-equity ratio 0.5
⇣ Return on assets 0.1
s Loan spread 0.0175
h Loan-to-value ratio 0.5
f Aggregate haircut on collateral to obtain funding form CB 0.1
◆ Propensity to lend 0.7
m Number of banks 25
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Parameters
'⇡ Inflation coe cient in Taylor rule 1.5
'y Output gap coe cient in Taylor rule 0.5
'U Unemployment coe cient in Taylor rule 1.1
'c Credit coe cient in Taylor rule 0.7
⇡⇤ Target inflation rate 0.03
⌘r Adjustment speed of evolving real rate target 0.0075
b⇤ Target debt-to-GDP ratio 0.33
 ⌧ Fiscal adjustment speed 0.054
  Corridor width (baseline,wide,narrow,asymmetric) [0.2, 1]
Workers/Consumers Parameters
" Demand parameter 7.0
 p Permanent income adjustment speed 0.4
✓ Frequency of innovation 100
  Job search probability 0.5
N Number of population 2400
Shops Parameters
µ¯ Average percentage markup over wage 0.138
S Setup cost 15
IS Critical inventory-to-sales ratio 3.0
 p Size of price cut 1.017
  Wage adjustment parameter 0.3
  Length of the contract period 12
n Number of goods 50
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Appendix C The balance-sheet matrix of the model
Table 4: The balance-sheet matrix of the model
Consumer Shop Bank Gov CB ⌃
Deposit +Dc +Ds  (Dc +Ds) 0
Loans  Ls +Ls, Lcb +Lcb 0
Loan-IB +IBb, IBb 0
Bond +Bb -B +Bcb 0
Inventory +I, SCb +SCb +I
HPM +Hc +Hs +Hb  Hcb 0
Balance  Ec  Es  Eb +GD  I
⌃ 0 0 0 0 0 0
aNote: The matrix describes the accounting structure of the model. All rows related to financial
assets or liabilities sum to zero except the inventories which are connected to tangible capital.
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Appendix D Model Results: Interaction Tables
Table 5: Macro-prudential and Monetary Policy in Corridor Regime:Normalized Values of Average
Output Gap Across Experiments
Corridor=1 Corridor=0.5 Corridor=0.7 Asymmetric
TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.9869⇤ 1.0000 0.9564⇤⇤ 1.0000 0.9664⇤⇤⇤ 1.0000 0.9456⇤
Basel III 0.9427⇤ 0.8051⇤⇤ 0.7164 0.7054⇤ 0.8115⇤ 0.7201⇤⇤ 0.7011⇤ 0.6994⇤
CAR3+CCB+LCR 1.1901⇤⇤ 1.1766⇤ 0.8926⇤ 0.8003⇤⇤ 0.9201⇤⇤ 0.8216⇤ 0.8143⇤ 0.7780⇤
CAR3+CCB+LR 1.2415⇤⇤ 1.2044⇤ 0.9814 0.8436⇤ 0.9647⇤ 0.9436 0.8446⇤⇤ 0.8136⇤
CAR3+CCB 0.9609⇤ 0.9240⇤ 0.7901⇤ 0.8040 0.8828⇤ 0.9211⇤ 0.8027⇤ 0.8094⇤⇤⇤
CAR3 1.2614⇤ 1.1318 1.0623⇤⇤ 0.9792⇤ 1.0565⇤ 1.0232⇤⇤ 1.0154 0.9645⇤
LCR 1.3245 1.2915⇤ 1.1215⇤ 1.0454⇤⇤ 1.2145 1.1574⇤ 1.0515⇤ 0.7243
LR 2.8674 2.6513⇤⇤⇤ 2.3015⇤⇤ 1.9467⇤ 2.6310⇤⇤ 2.4022⇤⇤⇤ 1.8476 1.8236⇤⇤
LCR+LR 2.5436⇤ 2.3255⇤ 2.0518⇤⇤ 1.9736⇤ 2.6913 2.3137⇤ 1.6794⇤ 1.6076⇤⇤
aNote: (***) significant at 1% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (*) significant at 10% level.
Table 6: Macro-prudential and Monetary Policy in Corridor Regime: Normalized Values of Unem-
ployment Across Experiments
Corridor=1 Corridor=0.5 Corridor=0.7 Asymmetric
TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.9612⇤ 1.0000 0.9304⇤ 1.0000 0.9312⇤⇤ 1.0000 0.9041⇤
Basel III 0.8125⇤ 0.7745⇤⇤ 0.7413⇤ 0.7196⇤⇤ 0.7906⇤ 0.7542⇤ 0.7671⇤ 0.7406⇤⇤⇤
CAR3+CCB+LCR 0.9103⇤ 0.8345⇤⇤ 0.8245⇤⇤ 0.7954⇤ 0.8414⇤ 0.8225⇤⇤ 0.8064⇤ 0.7849⇤
CAR3+CCB+LR 0.9313⇤ 0.9004 0.8613⇤ 0.8336⇤⇤⇤ 0.8847⇤⇤ 0.8496 0.8394 0.8013⇤⇤
CAR3+CCB 0.8726⇤ 0.8911⇤ 0.7604 0.7648⇤ 0.8051⇤ 0.8694 0.7790⇤ 0.7842⇤
CAR3 1.1338⇤ 1.0102⇤⇤ 1.0742⇤ 0.9615⇤⇤ 1.0314 0.9802⇤ 1.0204⇤ 0.9548
LCR 1.2748⇤ 1.1784⇤⇤⇤ 1.0504⇤⇤ 1.0415⇤ 1.1311⇤ 1.0984⇤⇤ 1.0465⇤⇤ 1.0330⇤
LR 1.6739 1.6315⇤ 1.5430⇤⇤ 1.5013 1.6144⇤⇤ 1.5932⇤ 1.4394⇤⇤ 1.4206
LCR+LR 1.5315 1.5046⇤ 1.4835⇤ 1.4806⇤⇤ 1.5051⇤ 1.4838 1.4150⇤⇤ 1.3817⇤
aNote: (***) significant at 1% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (*) significant at 10% level.
Table 7: Macro-prudential and Monetary Policy in Corridor Regime: Normalized Values of Likeli-
hood of Economic Crisis Across Experiments.
Corridor=1 Corridor=0.5 Corridor=0.7 Asymmetric
TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c TR⇡,y TR⇡,y,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.9611 1.0000 0.9154⇤ 1.0000 0.9241⇤ 1.0000 0.9012⇤⇤
Basel III 0.7226⇤ 0.6948⇤⇤ 0.6051⇤ 0.5744⇤⇤⇤ 0.6214⇤ 0.6033⇤ 0.6047⇤ 0.5654⇤
CAR3+CCB+LCR 0.8322⇤ 0.8196⇤ 0.7862⇤⇤ 0.7751⇤ 0.8114⇤ 0.7816⇤⇤ 0.7780 0.7565⇤
CAR3+CCB+LR 0.9913⇤ 0.9646 0.8336⇤ 0.8097⇤⇤ 0.8615⇤ 0.8436 0.7815⇤⇤⇤ 0.7636⇤
CAR3+CCB 0.7643⇤⇤ 0.8107⇤ 0.6507 0.6749⇤⇤ 0.6852⇤ 0.7341⇤⇤ 0.6441⇤ 0.6792⇤
CAR3 1.0612⇤⇤ 1.0452⇤ 1.0545⇤ 1.0451⇤⇤ 1.0604 1.0192⇤ 1.0284⇤ 0.9849⇤
LCR 1.4216 1.3702⇤⇤⇤ 1.0757 1.0203⇤⇤ 1.1456⇤ 1.0384⇤⇤ 0.9265⇤ 0.9195⇤⇤
LR 1.9744⇤ 1.9435 1.7610⇤⇤ 1.7412⇤ 1.8246⇤ 1.7894⇤⇤ 1.6942⇤⇤⇤ 1.6043
LCR+LR 1.8615 1.8236⇤ 1.7015⇤ 1.6635⇤⇤ 1.7370 1.7011⇤ 1.6204⇤⇤ 1.6044⇤
aNote: (***) significant at 1% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (*) significant at 10% level.
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